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Abstract—With the recent technological innovation, unmanned
aerial vehicles, known as drones, have found numerous applica-
tions including package and parcel delivery for shippers. Drone
delivery offers benefits over conventional ground-based vehicle
delivery in terms of faster speed, lower cost, more environment-
friendly, and less manpower needed. However, most of existing
studies on drone delivery planning and scheduling focus on
a single shipper and ignore uncertainty factors. As such, in
this paper, we consider a scenario that multiple shippers can
cooperate to minimize their drone delivery cost. We propose
the Bayesian Shipper Cooperation in Stochastic Drone Delivery
(BCoSDD) framework. The framework is composed of three func-
tions, i.e., package assignment, shipper cooperation formation
and cost management. The uncertainties of drone breakdown
and misbehavior of cooperative shippers are taken into account
by using multistage stochastic programming optimization and
dynamic Bayesian coalition formation game. We conduct exten-
sive performance evaluation of the BCoSDD framework by using
customer locations from Solomon benchmark suite and a real
Singapore logistics industry. As a result, the framework can help
the shippers plan and schedule their drone delivery effectively.
Index Terms—UAV, drone delivery, Shipper Cooperation,
Bayesian coalition formation game, uncertainties
I. INTRODUCTION
The market size of e-commerce has rapidly increased the
demand of logistics industry. The global e-commerce logistics
market will expand from US$122.2 billion in 2014 to US$781
billion in 2024 [1]. Accordingly, a package delivery service
becomes the most important business function in logistics.
Suppliers, which can be referred to as shippers, need to handle
massive package delivery demands while maintaining high
customer satisfaction. While majority of the package delivery
is done through ground-based vehicles, e.g., trucks, ariel
delivery using drones emerges as a promising solution because
of the cost efficiency, reliability, and energy consumption.
Drones have been on trial and adopted for small package
delivery by many companies such as Amazon (2013), DHL
(2013), Alibaba (2015), JD.com (2017), and Japan Post (2018).
However, drone delivery is not always an optimal solution. It
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has some major limitations including limited flying distance,
limited time, and weight capacity. Therefore, drone delivery
is expected to be combined with other delivery services such
as outsourcing package delivery to a third-party carrier. This
combined delivery becomes an appropriate option for shippers
to meet customers’ needs while maintaining low cost and high
reliability.
Alternatively, logistics business partnership becomes a vi-
able choice of reducing cost and improving delivery efficiency.
Multiple shippers can cooperate and form a pool of delivery
resources including depots, manpower, and drones [2]. For
example, a cooperative shipper can use vehicles to serve its
customers and when the vehicles are not used, they can be
utilized by the other cooperative shippers. This opportunistic
logistics resource sharing can clearly improve the resource
utilization and hence profitability.
With the cooperation among shippers with drones, the
shippers need to answer the following questions: (i) should
the shippers cooperate with other shippers? (ii) which shippers
should cooperate with? (iii) how can the shippers with coop-
eration absorb the delivery cost in a fair manner? and (iv)
how many drones are required and how to assign packages
to the drones or to use an outsource carrier. To address
these questions, we therefore propose the Bayesian Shipper
Cooperation in Stochastic Drone Delivery (BCoSDD) frame-
work for helping shippers to strategize their delivery planning
and resource sharing [3]. The contributions of this paper are
summarized as follows.
• In the proposed BCoSDD framework, we introduce the
package assignment based on multistage stochastic pro-
gramming optimization. The package assignment takes
the uncertainty of the drone breakdown into account to
assign packages to be delivered by drones with the lowest
cost while meeting all customers’ demand. While the
original problem of the package assignment is non-linear,
we reformulate the problem into a linear one that can be
solved more efficiently.
• We propose a shipper cooperation management. Specifi-
cally, a cooperation decision making process of the ship-
pers is modeled as a static and a dynamic Bayesian coali-
tion formation game, respectively. The static Bayesian
coalition formation game is applied when the belief
about the shippers is known a priori. Alternatively, the
dynamic Bayesian coalition formation game is applied
when the shippers have to observe and learn behaviors of
the other shippers without complete belief. We analyze
the stability of the shipper cooperation analytically and
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also present an algorithm to reach the stable solution.
Moreover, in reality, some shippers may misbehave in the
cooperation, e.g., a shipper may not deliver a package as
it is assigned, the algorithm is thus designed to learn the
shippers’ behavior and allow honest shippers to form the
cooperation effectively.
• Among the shippers cooperating with each other, the
incurred cost will be distributed. We therefore propose
cost management to allow the cooperative shippers to
share the cost of package delivery. The Shapley value
technique is adopted to reach a fair cost sharing.
In summary, the proposed BCoSDD framework is useful for
the shippers not only for their logistics resource and delivery
planning, but also for reaching an optimal business partnership
through cooperation to share the resources efficiently. The
ultimate goals are to achieve the minimum cost and stable
cooperation strategy by the shippers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
literature review of the vehicle routing problem, drone package
delivery, and the cooperation in package delivery. Section III
describes the system model, which consists of three compo-
nents, i.e., package assignment, shipper cooperation, and cost
management. The package assignment and the shipper coop-
eration are discussed in detail in Section IV and Section VI,
respectively. After that, the dynamic algorithm for shipper
cooperation formation is presented in Section VII. Section VIII
explains the experiment setting and gives performance evalua-
tion results of the proposed framework. Section IX concludes
the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since goods distribution is one of the major tasks in supply
chain, a number of studies have been conducted to address
the package delivery and vehicle routing problem (VRP) [4].
However, most of existing studies concentrate on ground-based
vehicle delivery, i.e., by motorcycle, car, and truck, as they are
convenient, efficient, and cost-effective. In the literature, there
are VRP surveys for ground-based vehicle delivery. Each of
the surveys considers a specific aspect of the problem, for
example, VRP with time windows [5], pick-up and delivery
VRP [6], dynamic VRP [7] and stochastic VRP [8], and
solution algorithms [9], [10].
Until recently, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), as known
as a drone, has emerged as an alternative package delivery
mode. This is due to the fact that the reliability has been
improved while the cost has been reduced substantially. As
such, the VRP is being considered again for the drone delivery.
Sundar et al. [11] proposed an approximation algorithm for a
single drone routing. The drone is assumed to depart from
a depot and visit multiple locations before returning to the
origin. The drone is allowed to stop over at different locations
to refuel or recharge its energy. However, this work does
not address the package delivery directly, and the proposed
scheme is suitable only for surveillance applications. Murray
and Chu [12] studied a package delivery problem by using the
combination of one drone and one truck. Since the drone may
not deliver a package to every customer due to limited payload
weight and/or flying distance, the truck can be used to serve
these customers. Optimization problems are proposed to min-
imize the delivery time. Ferrandez et al. [13] also considered
the joint truck and drone delivery problem. They proposed
mathematical formulations for closed-form estimations. The
K-mean algorithm and genetic algorithm are used to obtain
the delivery solution.
Dorling et al. [14] considered only drones for package
delivery planning. They proposed two drone routing opti-
mization problems given the constraints of capacity, battery
weight, changing and payload weight. The objectives are (i)
to minimize the cost subject to delivery time constraint and
(ii) to minimize the time subject to the budget cost constraint.
Then, they proposed the simulated annealing (SA) heuristic
algorithm to address the multi-trip drone routing problem.
Hong et al. [15] also studied the drone-only package delivery
problem. Unlike other previous studies that assume drones
to fly only over roads and street, the problem focuses on
the flying direction of drones, which can avoid barriers and
obstacles automatically. The problem is formulated as mix-
integer programming, and a heuristic algorithm is used to find
the solution. However, all the above studies do not consider
the uncertainty of a drone, e.g., drone breakdown, which
is common in practice. In our previous work [16], a joint
truck and drone delivery problem was formulated as a three-
stage stochastic programming problem with the objective to
minimize a set of costs while meeting the customers’ delivery
demand.
Since the cost is a sensitive factor in logistics industry,
partnership and cooperation among shippers are seen as a
viable solution to improve resource utilization in package
delivery problem. Krajewska et al. [17] introduced the joint
routing and cooperation among shippers for ground-based
package delivery. They used the Shapley value to fairly
distribute cost among shippers. Later on, the cooperative
game theory was used in many ground-based package delivery
studies [18], [19], and [20]. However, all of them concentrate
on presenting different methods for cost sharing. The review
of cost sharing for shipper cooperation in package delivery
was presented by Guajardo and Ronnqvist [21]. Recently,
Kaewpuang et al. [22] proposed a framework for shipper
cooperation for the capacitated vehicle routing problem with
time window. Instead of focusing on the cost sharing methods,
they considered the overlapping coalition formation among
shippers, i.e., one shipper may join multiple resource pools at
the same time. The Myerson value was adopted as the solution
to distribute cost among cooperative shippers.
However, it is essential to note that all previous studies of
the shipper cooperation in package delivery are dedicated to
the ground-based delivery. Moreover, none of them considers
the shippers’ misbehavior. The literature also misses the study
of jointly optimizing package assignment, shipper cooperation,
and cost management. Therefore, they are the focus of this
paper in which the uncertainty in drone breakdown is also
taken into consideration.
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III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
This section presents the proposed BCoSDD framework in
detail. The framework considers multiple shippers, and each
shipper is rational and self-interested. All the shippers have the
same objective that is to minimize their delivery cost while the
packet delivery must be done in a specific time slot, e.g. all
packages are delivered by the end of the day. The shippers can
use drones to deliver a package to a customer or outsource
a package delivery to a third-party carrier. The drone flies
from a depot to serve the customer and returns to the depot.
If a shipper outsources the package delivery to a carrier, the
shipper pays a fixed cost, i.e., a fee, to the carrier. When a
shipper or a coalition of shippers deliver multiple packages, the
delivery cost is assumed to be cheaper than that of outsourcing
package delivery. Nonetheless, outsourcing package delivery
to a carrier is still needed to meet customers’ demand in some
cases, for example, when drones cannot serve customers which
are not in the flying coverage area.
Furthermore, the shippers can cooperate and create a re-
source pool to minimize their delivery cost. Once the resource
pool is created, a shipper can let other cooperative shippers
the same pool deliver a package. In this case, the package can
be transferred from one depot to another depot of different
cooperative shippers to facilitate the use of drone for delivery,
i.e., drone sharing. With the resource pool, the incurred cost
will be distributed by the cooperative shippers forming the
same pool in a fair manner.
The BCoSDD framework is composed of three compo-
nents as shown in Figure 1. We first address the package
assignment component for an individual shipper or a coalition
of cooperative shippers, also called a coalition of shippers,
by an optimization technique. Next, we present the cost
management component which is done after the solution of
the package assignment problem is obtained. After that, the
shipper cooperation component is used to decide how the
shippers should cooperate and form a coalition and a resource
pool. The interactions among these components are as follows.
1) First, given a set of coalitions of cooperative shippers,
i.e., a coalition structure, the package assignment is
performed to assign packages to drones or to outsource
packages to a carrier.
2) Second, the optimal solution of the package assignment
is then used by the cost management to divide the
package delivery cost among the cooperative shippers
in the same group.
3) Third, given the cost divided among the cooperative
shippers, the shipper cooperation is performed, i.e.,
through the merge-and-split algorithm, to achieve the
stable coalition structure.
Shipper Cooperation
Merge & Split Algorithm
Package Assignment
Optimization (MIP)
Cost Management
Shapley Value
Cost
Sharing
Optimal
Solution
Coalitional
Structure
Fig. 1: The shipper cooperation in static BCoSDD framework.
IV. PACKAGE ASSIGNMENT
In this section, the package assignment is discussed in the
detail. We first introduce how the package assignment process
works. Then, we present the formulations of the package
assignment optimization.
A. Package Delivery Operation and Scenario Tree
Let P = {p1, p2, . . . , p|P|} be a set of all shippers in the
system, where |P| denotes the total number of shippers. Each
shipper p has one depot, a set of customers denoted by Cp,
and a set of drones denoted by Dp. Without loss of generality,
each customer has one package to be delivered. Note that if a
customer has two or more packages to be delivered, we can
consider that there are multiple customers located at the same
location.
The package assignment is executed for one given coalition
of cooperative shippers. Let S be a set of shippers that coop-
erate with each other, creating a resource pool and forming a
coalition S, i.e. S ⊂ P . The shippers in the same coalition
allow their drones to deliver packages of each other. In this
case, a shipper can transfer its packages from its depot to the
depots of other shippers. Accordingly, the packages of the cus-
tomers of the shippers in the same coalition will be delivered
by any of the drones. For example, for S = {p1, p2, p3} i.e.,
shippers p1, p2, and p3 cooperate and form a coalition, the set
of customers for this coalition is C = C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3 and the
set of drones in this coalition is D = D1 ∪D2 ∪D3. In other
words, C = {c1, c2, . . . , c|C|} and D = {d1, d2, . . . , d|D|}
denote the sets of customers and drones in the pool, where
|C| and |D| represent the total number of customers and the
total number of drones, respectively. As the drones are shared,
their utilization and efficiency can be increased. Note that if
the shipper does not cooperate with any other shippers, the
coalition contains only one shipper in which the same package
assignment still applies.
We assume that a drone can depart and return to the
same depot only and cannot switch the depot. This is, for
example, due to the flying program embedded in the drone.
However, although the reliability of drones have been im-
proved significantly, they are still subject to breakdown and
failure, e.g., from bad weather conditions. A drone breakdown
happens randomly. Thus, when a drone delivers a package to a
customer, it can be successful or fail. If there is no breakdown,
the drone will continue to deliver the next customer until all
the assigned packages are delivered. However, if there is a
breakdown, the drone cannot be used to deliver the rest of
the assigned packages. In this case, the shippers have to pay
penalty such as compensation to the customers of the rest of
the assigned packages. Note that shippers can outsource the
package delivery to a third-party carrier. However, the cost of
outsourcing is typically higher than that of using their drones.
Nonetheless, outsourcing can still be used, for example, if the
chance of drown breakdown is high because of looming bad
weather conditions.
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Serving
1st
customer
Serving
2nd
customer
Serving
3rd
customer
Serving
4th
customer
Serving
the last
customer
Not break
1− Pd
. . .
No penalty needs
to be paid
Pay the penalty for
the last package
Pay the penalty for
the left over packages
Not break
1− Pd
Break
Pd
Break
Pd
Not break
1− Pd
Break
Pd
Not break
1− Pd
Break
Pd
Not break
1− Pd
Fig. 2: An example of a scenario tree of a drone.
B. Package Assignment Formulations
We formulate the package assignment problem as a multi-
stage stochastic programming optimization. Figure 2 shows a
scenario tree example of the stochastic model for one drone. In
the first stage, the following activities happen, i.e., the drone
is reserved for the delivery, selected packages are transferred
to different depots, and the shippers outsource the package
delivery to the carrier. From the second stage, each of the
stages is associated with the delivery of one package of a
customer sequentially in which the total number of stages is
|c|th. At the transition from the current stage to the next stage,
there are two possible events, i.e., the delivery is successful
or fails, which is represented by a branch. If the delivery is
successful, the next stage ensues. However, if the delivery fails,
the penalty is paid and the transition terminates as the drone
cannot be used to deliver the rest of the assigned packages.
Here, Pd denotes a breakdown probability of drone d, which
can be calculated based on historical data.
The objective of the package assignment is to minimize the
total delivery cost of a coalition of cooperative shippers, i.e.,
OST . The multi-stage stochastic programming formulation is
expressed as follows:
Minimize:
OST(S) = ODE +
∑
d∈D
Nd∑
j=1
(
(1− Pd)j−1PdC(p)(Nd − j + 1)
)
,
(1)
where
ODE =
∑
d∈D
C
(i)
d Wd +
∑
i∈C,d∈D,p∈S
(
C
(r)
p,i + C
(r)
i,p
)
Yi,d,p
+
∑
p∈S
C(t)p Tp +
∑
i∈C
C
(c)
i Zi, (2)
subject to (3) - (16). Recall that the optimization formulation
of the package assignment is for a given coalition S. Nonethe-
less, we omit S in the expressions and notations for the rest
of this section to simply the presentation.
The delivery cost as expressed in (1) is composed of
• the initial cost of drone d, i.e., C(i)d ,
• the routing cost of drone d to travel from the depot of
shipper p to customer i, i.e., C(r)p,i ,
• the cost of shipper p transferring packages among depots
of the resource pool, i.e., C(t)p ,
• the outsourcing cost per package, i.e., C(c)i paid to a
carrier, and
• the penalty cost when the drones fail to deliver a package,
i.e., C(p).
There are seven decision variables in the formulation, includ-
ing Wd, Yi,d,p, Zi, Tp, Mi,p,q , Bd,p, and Nd. The definitions
of these decision variables are as follows.
• Wd is the indicator whether drone d is used or not, i.e.,
if Wd = 1, drone d will be used in the delivery, and
Wd = 0 otherwise.
• Yi,d,p is the allocation variable. If Yi,d,p = 1, customer
i will be served by drone d, and the drone will depart
from depot p, and Yi,d,p = 0 otherwise.
• Zi is the indicator whether customer i will be served by
a drone or not. If Zi = 1, customer i will not be served
by any drone, and Zi = 0 otherwise.
• Tp is the indicator whether shipper p has to transfer
packages from/to other shippers or not. If Tp = 1, shipper
p will transfer packages to another cooperative shipper,
and Tp = 0 otherwise.
• Mi,p,q is the indicator whether shipper p transfers the
package of customer i to shipper q or not. If Mi,p,q = 1,
shipper p transfers the package of customer i to shipper q,
and Mi,p,q = 0 otherwise.
• Bd,p is an auxiliary variable for imposing a drone to have
only one departure and returning depot.
• Nd is the total number of customers that will be served
by drone d.
The package assignment is subject to the constraints in (3)
- (16). ∑
i∈C,p∈S
Yi,d,p ≤ ∆Wd, ∀d ∈ D (3)∑
i∈C,q∈S
Mi,p,q ≤ ∆Tp, ∀p ∈ S (4)∑
i∈C,q∈S
Mi,q,p ≤ ∆Tp, ∀p ∈ S (5)
ai
∑
p∈S
Yi,d,p ≤ fd, ∀i ∈ C, d ∈ D (6)∑
d∈D,p∈S
Yi,d,p + Zi = 1, ∀i ∈ C (7)
oi,p −
∑
q∈S
Mi,p,q ≤ ∆
∑
d∈D
(Yi,d,p + Zi) , ∀i ∈ C, p ∈ S
(8)
The constraint in (3) ensures that the initial cost of a drone
is paid when any packages are assigned to the drone. Note
that ∆ denotes a large number. The constraints in (4) and (5)
ensure that the package transferring cost is paid when shippers
transfer packages to the other shippers. The constraint in (6)
ensures that the total weight of a package to be delivered
by a drone does not exceed the capacity limit of the drone,
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where drone d can carry a package with the weight up to fd
kilograms. The constraints in (7) and (8) ensure that all the
customer packages are assigned to a drone, or otherwise the
outsourcing cost needs to be paid. We use variable oi,p = 1 to
define that customer i belongs to shipper p, and oi,p = 0
otherwise. We have the condition
∑
p∈P oi,p = 1 for all
i ∈ C. If oi,p = 1, a drone that will deliver the package of
customer i must depart from the depot of shipper p. Otherwise,
the package must either be transferred to a new depot or
outsourced to a carrier. The constraints in (9) to (11) ensure
that the drone does not travel exceeding the coverage area,
traveling distance limit, and traveling time limit, respectively.
Here, ti is the serving time, i.e., the time that the drone spends
to search and drop a package at the destination. The drone has
flying distance limits, which are up to ed kilometers per trip
and ld kilometers per day. The average flying speed of drone
d is denoted as sd. Let ki,j denote the flying distance from
location i to location j.
∑
p∈S
Yi,d,p (kp,i + ki,p) ≤ ed, ∀i ∈ C, d ∈ D (9)∑
i∈C,p∈S
Yi,d,p (kp,i + ki,p) ≤ ld, ∀d ∈ D
(10)∑
i∈C,p∈S
(
ki,p + ki,p
sd
+ ti
)
Yi,d,p ≤ hd, ∀d ∈ D
(11)
The constraints in (12) to (14) are the package transferring
constraints. The constraint in (12) ensures that if a package
is transferred to a new depot, the drone must depart from the
new depot. The constraint in (13) ensures that a package can
only be transferred once. The constraint in (14) ensures that
no package is transferred to the original depot. The constraints
in (15) and (16) ensure that a drone can only depart from and
arrive to only one depot.
Mi,p,q ≤
∑
d∈D
Yi,d,q, ∀i ∈ C,∀p ∈ S,∀q ∈ S (12)∑
p∈S,q∈S
Mi,p,q = 1, ∀i ∈ C (13)
Mi,p,p = 0, ∀i ∈ C,∀p ∈ S (14)∑
i∈C
Yi,d,p ≤ ∆Bd,p, ∀d ∈ D,∀p ∈ S (15)∑
p∈S
Bd,p = 1, ∀d ∈ D (16)∑
i∈C,p∈S
Yi,d,p ≤ Nd, ∀d ∈ D (17)
0 ≤ Nd ≤ |C|, ∀d ∈ D (18)
The constraints in (17) and (18) limit the number of serving
customers. The constraint in (17) calculates the total number of
customers that are served by drone d, i.e., Nd. The constraint
in (18) ensures that Nd is a positive integer and must be less
than the total number of customers.
We can obtain the solution of the package assignment by
solving the above multi-stage stochastic programming opti-
mization. However, it is a quadratic programming problem as
the objective function is in a quadratic form. Since quadratic
programming problems can be more complex to solve than
linear programming problems, next we transform the quadratic
programming problem to the linear programming problem.
C. Linear Programming Model
We reformulate the quadratic programming problem in (1)
to the linear programming problem by introducing three
auxiliary variables and three auxiliary constraints. The linear
objective function is presented in (19).
Minimize:
OST = ODE +
∑
i∈C,d∈D
Ai,d, (19)
subject to (3) - (18) and (20) - (23). ODE can be calculated
from (2).
The definitions of the three auxiliary variables are as fol-
lows.
• Ai,d is an auxiliary positive variable. The value of Ai,d
will be a part of breakdown penalty, which is incurred by
drone d.
• Xi,d is an auxiliary binary variable. Xi,d = 1 when the
order of i is less than or equal to the total number of
drone d to be used in the delivery. Otherwise, Xi,d = 0.
• Vi,d is an auxiliary positive variable. The value of Vi,d
will be a part of breakdown penalty, which is incurred by
drone d.
∑
i∈C
Xi,d = Nd, ∀d ∈ D (20)
Xi,d ≥ Xj,d, ∀i, j ∈ C, i < j,∀d ∈ D (21)
Vi,d + ∆Xi,d ≤ ∆ +Ai,d, ∀d ∈ D,∀i ∈ C (22)
Vi,d =
 ∏
j∈C,j<i
(1− P)
PC(p)
Nd − (∑
j∈C,j<i
1) + 1
 ,
∀d ∈ D, i ∈ C (23)
The constraints in (20) and (21) ensure that the customer
serving order does not exceed the total number of the cus-
tomers. For example, if drone d serves five customers, i.e.,
Nd = 5, Xi,d = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 5, and Xi,d = 0 for
i > 5. Note that Xi,d is not related to a specific customer,
and the set C and the index i are used for simplifying the
parameter declaration. The constraint in (22) ensures that
Ai,d = Vi,d when i is the first Nd customers, i.e., Xi,d = 1 for
i = 1, . . . , Nd. The constraint in (23) calculates the expected
value of the penalty incurred by the drone breakdown.
The above optimization can be solved by using a linear pro-
gramming solver. W ∗d , Y
∗
i,d,p, Z
∗
i , T
∗
p , M
∗
i,p,q , B
∗
d,p, N
∗
d , A
∗
i,d,
X∗i,d, and V
∗
i,d represent the optimal solutions of Wd, Yi,d,p,
Zi, Tp, Mi,p,q , Bd,p, Nd, Ai,d, Xi,d, and Vi,d, respectively.
The optimal total delivery cost is denoted by OST∗ which is
used in the cost management.
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V. COST MANAGEMENT
With the solution of the package assignment, the delivery
cost will be shared among the multiple cooperative shippers
in the same coalition. Let OST∗(S) denote the total delivery
cost incurred to the cooperative suppliers in coalition S.
Note that OST∗(S) can be obtained from solving the package
assignment problem, e.g., the solution of (1), the detail of
which is given in Section IV. Let vp(S) denote the cost that
shipper p needs to pay for the delivery when joining coalition
S. Thus, OST∗(S) = ∑p∈S vp(S). In this paper, we use
the Shapley value [23] to achieve the solution of the cost
management, i.e., the delivery cost shared by the cooperative
shippers in the same coalition. The Shapley value can be
expressed as follows:
vp(S) =
∑
Q⊆S\{p}
|Q|!(|S| − |Q| − 1)!
|S|!
(
OST∗(Q∪ {p})−OST∗(Q)) ,
(24)
where |P| represents the total number of shippers, and |S|
represents the number of shippers in coalition S. The four
properties of Shapley value are listed as follow:
• Efficiency The coalition cost is equal to the summation
of the individual costs, i.e., OST∗(S) = ∑p∈S vp(S). As
a result, the sum of the coalition cost will be minimized.
• Symmetry If shippers p and q join a coalition S, and the
total coalition cost is the same, i.e., OST∗(S ∪ {p}) =
OST∗(S∪{q}), then vp(S) = vq(S). As such, the shared
cost for shipper p and shipper q will be the same if they
join coalition S and contribute the same.
• Linearity Let OA and OB be a function, which is similar
to function OST. When OA and OB are characteristic
functions, vp(S,OA + OB) = vp(S,OB + OA) =
vp(S,OA)+vp(S,OB). Note that vp(S,OST) is referred
to vp(S) since we only use function OST in this paper.
• Zero player A shipper p does not need to pay the delivery
cost if the coalition cost remains the same when shipper
p joins in, i.e., vp(S) = 0 when OST∗(Q) = OST∗(Q ∪
{p}) and Q ⊆ S.
VI. COOPERATION MANAGEMENT: STATIC BAYESIAN
COALITION FORMATION GAME
The shippers can partner, i.e., cooperate, with each other and
form a coalition for establishing a resource pool for package
delivery. In this regard, all shippers need to decide to cooperate
or not cooperate with other shippers to minimize their costs.
Recall that P is a set of all shippers in the system, and S is
a coalition, i.e., a set, of cooperative shippers establishing a
resource pool. Let Φ = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φ|Φ|} denote the set of
all possible coalition structures, where |Φ| is the total number
of all coalition structures which can be calculated from Bell
number [23] with |P| as a parameter. In a coalition structure,
there is one or more coalition, i.e., φ = {. . . ,Sl, . . . }. We
have Sl ∩ Sl′ = ∅ for all l 6= l′ when coalitions Sl and Sl′
are in the same coalition structure φ.
⋃
l∈φ Sl = P for every
coalition structure. The coalition structure is basically a set
of all coalitions that include all the shippers, i.e., P = S1 ∪
S2 ∪ · · · ∪ S|φ|. For example, with P = {p1, p2, p3, p4} and
φ = {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}}, this coalition structure consists of
two coalitions, i.e., S1 = {p1, p2} and S2 = {p3, p4}, where
the shipper p1 cooperates with the shipper p2 and the shipper
p3 cooperates with the shipper p4.
Next, we consider the fact that shippers can misbehave when
they join a coalition. For example, given the solution of the
package assignment for a coalition, a misbehaving shipper may
not deliver packages of other shippers in the same coalition,
even if they agree to cooperate. Therefore, we classify shippers
into two types as follows:
• Good (TG) is a shipper that delivers all assigned pack-
ages.
• Bad (TB) is a shipper that does not deliver all assigned
packages, and the undelivered packages belong to other
shippers in the same coalition.
Each shipper has a belief probability about other shippers.
Let bpq denote a type that shipper p believes about shipper q.
Let P (bpq = TG) and P (bpq = TB) denote the probabilities
that shipper p believes that shipper q is a good cooperative
shipper and a bad cooperative shipper, respectively. Moreover,
shipper p believes that shipper q is a good cooperative shipper
with probability P (bpq = TG) = λpq . Thus, P (bpq = TB) =
1− λpq .
To address the uncertainty in the suppleirs’ behavior, we
formulate the BCoSDD as a Bayesian coalition formation
game as presented as follows:
G =< S,T, P, (µp)p∈S , (p)p∈S >, (25)
where the definitions of the parameters are given as follows.
• Let S = {. . . , Pp, . . . } denote a coalition, i.e., a set of
shippers, that join the resource pool, and S ⊂ P . |S|
denotes the total number of the shippers in coalition S.
Note that p and q are the indexes of the elements in set
S.
• Let T =
∏
p∈S Tp be the type space of all shippers in S,
where Tp = {TG,TB} denotes a set of possible types of
shipper p.
• P is the probability distribution over the types of ship-
pers, i.e., P (bpq = TB) and P (bpq = TG).
• Let µp denote the expected payoff, i.e., the delivery cost
that shipper p needs to pay.
• Let p present the preference of shipper p.
In the following, we give the details of the expected payoff
and the preference condition. Then, we present the methods to
achieve the solution of the Bayesian coalition formation game,
which can be referred to as the stable coalition structure. We
can analyze the stable coalition structure by using the markov
transition process. We can also reach the stable coalition
structure by using the merge and split algorithm.
A. Expected Payoff (µp)
If we do not consider the uncertainty of misbehaving
shippers, we can directly use the Shapley value, which is
discussed in Section V. Since we consider the misbehaving
uncertainty, the expected payoff has to be derived. Again,
µp denotes the expected delivery cost that shipper p needs
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to pay, including the penalty of the undelivered packages
which is incurred from the misbehaving shipper. Let Kp(S) =∏
q∈S\{p} Tq denote the set of the possible belief combina-
tions between shipper p and the other cooperative shippers,
i.e. q ∈ S \ {p}. The total number of members in Kp(S)
is 2(|S|−1). For example, if S = {p1, p2, p3} and p = p1,
K1(S) = {k1, k2, . . . , k2|s|−1} = T2 × T3 = {k1 = (b12 =
TG, b13 = T
G), k2 = (b12 = T
G, b13 = T
B), k3 = (b12 =
TB, b13 = T
G), k4 = (b12 = T
B, b13 = T
B)}. The expected
delivery cost of shipper p can be calculated from
µp(S) = vp(S) +
∑
k∈Kp(S)
∑
q∈S\{p}
ΩkpΛkpq, (26)
where Ωkp is the probability that the belief combination k
happens, and Λkpq denotes the incurred cost when the belief
combination k happens, and shipper q does not delivery
packages for shipper p. Again, vp(S) can be obtained from
the cost management in Section V. Ωkp is obtained from
Ωkp =
∏
q∈S\{p}
P (bpq = t), (27)
where t is the type taken from space T, and Λkpq is obtained
from
Λkpq =
{
0, if bpq = TG,
θpqC
(p)(1− λpq), if bpq = TB.
(28)
θpq denotes the total number of the packages that shipper p
transfers to shipper q, i.e., θpq =
∑
i∈CM
∗
p,q , where M
∗
p,q can
be obtained from the package assignment in Section IV.
B. Preference Relations
We adopt the preference relations from [24]. Again, let p
present the preference of shipper p. For example, (S1, φm) p
(S2, φn) means that shipper p prefers to join coalition S1
from coalition structure φm over to join coalition S2 from
coalition structure φn. The preference relation of a shipper
can be calculated from
(S1, φm) p (S2, φn)←→ νp(S1, φm) ≥ νp(S2, φn), (29)
where p ∈ S1, p ∈ S2, and S1 and S2 are any two coalitions.
The preference function is represented as νp and is defined as
follows:
νp(S, φ) =

µp(S, φ), if µq(S, φ) ≤ µq(S \ {q}, φ)
∀q ∈ S \ {q} and |S| 6= 1
0 otherwise,
(30)
This function requires three inputs, i.e., (i) a main shipper p,
(ii) coalition S, and (iii) the coalition structure of coalition S,
which is φ. From (30), shipper p will switch from the current
coalition Sm to a another coalition Sn when shipper p prefers
the new coalition Sn over coalition Sm, i.e., (Sn∪{p}, φn) p
(Sm, φ), where Sm and Sn ∈ φ. As a result, the new coalition
structure is φn = {φ \ {Sm,Sn}} ∪ {Sm \ {p},Sn ∪ {p}}.
C. Merge and Split Algorithm
According to the coalition structure switching, one shipper
can join or leave a coalition at a time. Therefore, the merge
and split algorithm is adopted from [24] as presented in
Algorithm 1. The algorithm is composed of four major steps,
i.e., neighboring coalition search (Line 3), the calculation of
Shapley value (Line 8 to Line 9), the calculation of Bayesian
cost (Line 12 to Line 17), and stable state checking (Line
18 to Line 21). The algorithm terminates when the current
coalition structure φm cannot change to any neighboring
coalition structure.
Algorithm 1 Merge and Split Algorithm for Cooperation
Management
Input: Set P and all the coalition cost V (S) obtained by
solving the package assignment optimization problem
Output: A stable coalition structure, the individual cost for
each shipper, the drone delivery planning
Initialization : All shippers do not cooperate
1: while φm changes do
2: φn = The list of φm neighboring coalition structures,
which can be found by using the neighboring coalition
discovery algorithm [24], [25].
3: for every b ∈ φn do
4: for every p ∈ P do
5: Co and Cb are the coalitions that p belongs to
coalition structure φm and φn, respectively.
6: for every S ∈ φm do
7: Obtain OST∗(S), ∀S ∈ φm //call the coali-
tion cost, which can be obtained by solving
the package assignment optimization problem of
coalition S
vp(S)← OST∗(S) //solve for the Shapley Value
8: end for
9: for every S ∈ φn do
10: Obtain OST∗(S), ∀S ∈ φn //call the coali-
tion cost, which can be obtained by solving
the package assignment optimization problem of
coalition S
vp(S)← OST∗(S) //solve for the Shapley Value
11: end for
12: if p has visited Cb before and |Cb| > 1 then
13: νp(Cb, φn) = 0
14: else
15: νp(Cb, φn) is calculated from (30)
16: end if
17: Calculate νp(Co, φm) from (30)
18: if νp(Co, φm) ≥ νp(Cb, φn) then
19: φm = φn; // the coalition structure has changed
break; // break to the while loop (Line 2)
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: end while
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Fig. 3: The state transition diagram of three shippers.
D. Markov Transition Process
Let a set of coalition structures, i.e., Φ = {φ1, φ2, . . . , φ|Φ|},
be the state space of the markov transition process. Let ρφm,φn
denote a transition probability when transiting from state φm
to state φn, which can be referred to as coalition structure φm
is changed to coalition structure φn. Based on the preference
relations in Sectione VI-B, only one shipper can change from
coalition structure φm to coalition struture φn at a time.
Figure 3 shows the example of the state transition diagram
when there are three shippers. Let Hφ denote the set of
the neighboring coalition structures of coalition structure
φ, which only one shipper can change a coalition at a
time. For example, if φm = {{p1}, {p2}, {p3}}, Hφm =
{{{p1, p2}, {p3}}, {{p1, p3}, {p2}}, {{p2, p3}, {p1}}}. Let
Bφm,φn denote the probability that coalition structure φm
will change to coalition structure φn, which can be calculated
from
Bφm,φn =

1−∑φ∈Φ Bφm,φ, if φm = φn,
0, else if φn /∈ Hφm ,
εβφm,φn , else if
νb(Sm, φm) < νb(Sn, φn),
for all b ∈ Bφm,φn
(1− ε)βφm,φn , otherwise,
(31)
βφm,φn = α
|Bφm,φn |(1− α)|P|−|Bφm,φn | (32)
where Bφm,φn represents the set of customers that are involved
to the transition from coalition structure φm to coalition
structure φn, and |Bφm,φn | denotes the total number of the
shippers in set Bφm,φn . Note that α denotes the probability
that a shipper changes its coalition.
Given transition probability matrix Q, which is expressed
as follows:
Q =

B1,1 B1,2 . . . B1,|Φ|
B2,1 B2,2 . . . B2,|Φ|
...
...
. . .
B|Φ|,1 B|Φ|,2 B|Φ|,|Φ|
 , (33)
we can obtain the stationary probability vector by solving
~Π>Q = ~Π>, ~Π>~1 = 1, (34)
where ~Π = [pi1, pi2, . . . , pi|Φ|]> denotes the stationary proba-
bility vector, and piφ is the probability that coalition structure
φ will be formed.
VII. COOPERATION MANAGEMENT: DYNAMIC BAYESIAN
COALITION FORMATION GAME
As discussed in the previous section, we can use the merge
and split algorithm to obtain a stable coalition structure in
the static Bayesian coalition formation game. In this section,
we extend the static Bayesian coalition formation game to the
dynamic one that allows a shipper to observe behaviors and
update the belief about the other cooperative shippers in the
same coalition continuously. Therefore, the dynamic Bayesian
coalition formation game can be used even when the shippers
do not have prior knowledge about the other shippers. In
particular, a shipper observes the behavior of the cooperative
shippers whether all the packages are successfully delivered
by them or not. The belief probability, i.e., P (bp,q = TG) and
P (bp,q = T
B), is updated based on the observation.
We propose the belief update mechanism based on the
Bayes’ theorem [26] and the algorithm in [27]. There are three
possible conditions involved in the belief update mechanism
of shipper p about shipper q, namely: (i) ω(F ) is the condition
that shipper q’s delivery is not successful due to technical
issues, (ii) ω(G) is the condition that shipper q is a cooperative
shipper., and (iii) Ω(B) is the condition that shipper q is a bad
cooperative shipper, i.e., its real type is Bad. Let Ω = T
represent that the condition Ω is true, and Ω = F otherwise,
where Ω ∈ {Ω(F ),Ω(G),Ω(B)}. Here, we have Pp,q(Ω(B) =
T ) = Pp,q(Ω
(G) = F ) = 1−Pp,q(Ω(G) = T ). The probability
that the condition Ω(G) is true is equal to the belief probability,
i.e., Pp,q(Ω(G)) = P (bp,q = TG) = λp,q . Figure 4 presents
the tree diagram of the belief update mechanism with the three
conditions and their corresponding probabilities. Let  denote
an error probability that the delivery by the good cooperative
shipper is unsuccessful.
Likewise, Table I shows all the joint probabilities. There are
eight cases, but only three cases can happen. The cases ω1,
ω4, ω5 and ω8 will not happen because Ω(G) and Ω(B) cannot
be true at the same time, and ω3 will not happen because the
bad cooperative shipper will not deliver the package. From
Table I, we can show that
Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = T |Ω(G) = T )+
Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = F |Ω(G) = T ) + Pp,q(Ω(B) = T ) = 1, (35)
where
Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = T |Ω(G) = T ) = λp,q, (36)
Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = F |Ω(G) = T ) = λp,q(1− ), (37)
Pp,q(Ω
(B) = T ) = 1− λp,q. (38)
Consequently, the probabilities that a package of shipper p is
delivered successfully and unsuccessfully by shipper q, i.e.,
Pp,q(S) and Pp,q(U), can be calculated from
Pp,q(S) =Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = F |Ω(G) = T ) = θ
′
p,q
θp,q
(39)
Pp,q(U) =Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = T |Ω(G) = T ) + Pp,q(Ω(B) = T )
=1− θ
′
p,q
θp,q
, (40)
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Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = T |Ω(G) = T )
Pp,q(Ω
(F ) = F |Ω(G) = T )
Pp,q(Ω
(B) = T )

λp,q
1− λp,q
1− 
Fig. 4: Tree diagram of the belief update mechanism of shipper
p about shipper q.
TABLE I: Truth table to the joint probabilities of the belief
update mechanism.
Scenario Ω(F ) Ω(G) Ω(B) Joint Probability
ω1 T T T 0
ω2 T T F λp,q
ω3 T F T 0
ω4 T F F 0
ω5 F T T 0
ω6 F T F λp,q(1− )
ω7 F F T 1− λp,q
ω8 F F F 0
where θ′p,q denotes the exact number of the packages that
shipper q successfully delivers for shipper p. Again, θp,q
represents the total number of the packages that shipper p
transfers to shipper q, and shipper q needs to deliver them.
From (39) and (40), we can obtain the new belief probability
λt+1p,q in iteration t based on the observation as follows:
λt+1p,q =

θ′p,q
θp,q(1− ) , if
θ′p,q
θp,q
< 1− 
1, otherwise.
(41)
However, the new belief probability λp,q from (41) is in-
dependent of the past as the probability is based on only
current observation. Therefore, the weight adjustment from the
exponential moving average (EMA) method [28] can be used
to update the belief probability as follows:
λt+1p,q = w1λ
t
p,q + w2λ
t+1
p,q (42)
where λt+1p,q on the right hand side is obtained from (41). The
constants w1 and w2 are adjustable weight parameters, for
w1 + w2 = 1 and 0 ≤ w1, w2 ≤ 1.
Algorithm 2 shows all steps of dynamic Bayesian coalition
formation. The belief update mechanism, which is based on
(35) to (42) and the merge and split algorithm are used
in Algorithm 2. When the shippers perform the package
delivery by following the planning solution for multiple times,
the belief probabilities converge to constants, and thus the
algorithm also converges to the same stable coalition structure
as achieved when all the types of shippers are exactly known.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first describe the experimental setup.
Next, we discuss the experimental results to demonstrate the
performance of the BCoSDD framework.
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Bayesian Coalition Formation
Output: Drone delivery planning solution
1: repeat
2: Perform Algorithm 1
3: Perform package delivery based on the solution of
Algorithm 1
4: Observe whether the packages are successfully deliv-
ered or not, i.e., θ′p,q .
5: for every p ∈ P do
6: for every q ∈ P do
7: if shipper p transfers packages to shipper q then
8: Update the belief probability as in (42)
9: else
10: λt+1p,q ← λtp,q
11: end if
12: end for
13: end for
14: t← t+ 1
15: until Terminates
A. Experiment Setup
We consider four shippers, i.e., P = {p1, p2, p3, p4}. Each
shipper p ∈ P has one drone, and their drones are identical.
The initial cost of the drones is set as C(i) = S$100. The limits
of the drones are set as fd = 5 kilograms, ed = 10 kilometers,
ld = 150 kilometers, and hd = 8 hours. We use the average
flying speed of drones which is sd = 30 kilometers per hour in
the experiments. The serving time is set as ti = 15 minutes for
all i ∈ C. All the customer packages in the experiments weight
less than 5 kilograms, i.e., ai ≤ 5 kilograms. Note that the
parameter setting is based on [16] and a Singapore company.
When the shippers cooperate, they share their customers and
drones in the resource pool. The transferring cost from the
original depot to the new depot is set as C(t) = S$30 per
transfer. The outsourcing cost is set as C(c)i = S$16 based
on the speedpost service provided by Singpost company [29].
Similarly, the penalty of breakdown is set as C(p)i = S$16.
Therefore, the shippers may handle the unsuccessful delivery
packages by outsourcing them to the carrier. The probability
that shipper p believes that shipper q are a good cooperative
shipper is set as P (bpq = TG) = 0.9 for all p, q ∈ P .
We evaluate the BCoSDD framework with two datasets of
customers’ locations, i.e., the Solomon benchmark suites [30]
and a real dataset from logistics industry in Singapore. The
Solomon benchmark file C101 is synthesized to have four
depots and 60 customers, i.e., |c| = 60. Alternatively, 100
customers, i.e., |c| = 100, are considered for the real
dataset experiments. The locations of depots and customers
in the two datasets are shown in Figure 5a. The number
of customers is shared equally among the shippers. We set
C1 = {c1, c5, . . . , cc′−3} to be the customers of shipper p1,
C2 = {c2, c6, . . . , cc′−2} to be the customers of shipper p2,
C3 = {c3, c7, . . . , cc′−1} to be the customers of shipper p3,
and C4 = {c4, c8, . . . , cc′} to be the customers of shipper p4.
We implement the optimization model of package assign-
ment as a linear programming in GAMS [31] and, it is solved
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(a) The synthesized Solomon Benchmark data. (b) A real data from logistics industry in Singapore.
Fig. 5: The locations of customers and depots.
by a commercial solver CPLEX [31].
B. Analysis of Cooperation Management
The initial cost of drones is set as C(i)d = S$0 and
C
(i)
d = S$90, where C
(i)
d = S$0 is when a shipper has
its own drone and does not need to pay for the initial cost.
We consider the traditional approach which is referred to as
deterministic approach, and the Bayesian approach, i.e., the
BCoSDD framework. The deterministic approach considers
the case that all shippers are the good cooperative shippers, and
they always deliver all packages successfully. However, the
Bayesian approach considers the case that all shippers believe
that other cooperative shippers may fail to deliver packages
with probability P (bpq = TB) = 1 − P (bpq = TG) = 0.1
for all p, q ∈ P . Table II shows the individual delivery cost
for all the coalition structures, i.e., Φ1 to Φ15. The stationary
probabilities obtained from the Markov model are presented
in Figure 6a. The selected coalition structures of the merge
and split algorithm are shown in Figure 6b, where the last
selection is the stable coalition structure.
When we set C(i)d = S$0, and there are three stable coali-
tion structures in the deterministic and Bayesian approaches,
i.e., Φ11, Φ14, and Φ15. The coalition structures Φ14 and Φ15
have the highest probabilities in the deterministic approach and
the Bayesian approach, respectively. Identically, the merge and
split algorithm achieves Φ14 and Φ15 as the stable coalition
structures for the deterministic approach and the Bayesian
approach, respectively. Since both shippers p1 and p4 want
to cooperate with shipper p3, and shipper p3 can choose to
cooperate such that its cost is minimized. As a result, shipper
p3 cooperates with shipper p4, and the resulting coalition
structure is Φ7 for the deterministic approach. By contrast,
shipper p3 cooperates with shipper p1, and the resulting
coalition structure is Φ3 for the Bayesian approach. For the
deterministic approach, shippers p3 and p4 allow shipper
p2 to join the coalition in the seventh iteration, and the
corresponding coalition structure is Φ14 to lower the cost. The
stable coalition structure is Φ14 as shipper p4 does not allow
shipper p1 to join the coalition because the shipper p4 will
pay a higher cost if coalition structure Φ15 is reached. On the
other hand, coalition structure Φ15 is stable for the Bayesian
approach because all the shippers achieve the lowest cost when
this coalition structure is reached.
When we set C(i)d = S$90, Φ15 is the stable coalition
structure from both the Markov model and the merge and
split algorithm for the deterministic approach. However, there
is no stable coalition structure for the Bayesian approach
since all the stationary probabilities are less than 0.13 and the
merge and split algorithm terminates with the initial coalition
structure. As such, the shippers should not cooperate with each
other as the initial cost C(i)d = S$90 is high, and hence the
cooperation results in higher cost than outsourcing the package
delivery to the carrier.
We have shown that the merge and split algorithm can
achieve the same solution as that from the Markov model.
While the Markov model requires the Shapley values of
all the coalition structures before being solved, the merge
and split algorithm needs only the Shapley values of the
neighboring coalition structures when changing the selected
coalition structure. For example, the merge and split algorithm
does not require the Shapley values of coalition structures Φ11
and Φ12 in the experiment for the deterministic approach with
C
(i)
d = S$0.
C. Impact of the Optimization
To understand the results in the cooperation management
more deeply, we thus evaluate only the package assignment
of the BCoSDD framework. We conduct four experiments
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TABLE II: Shapley value and coalition structures
Deterministic (Initial Cost = 0) Bayesian (Initial Cost = 0) Deterministic (Initial Cost = 90) Bayesian (Initial Cost = 90)
Coaltition Structure P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4 P1 P2 P3 P4
Φ1= {{p1},{p2},{p3},{p4}} 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ2= {{p1,p2},{p3},{p4}} 174.75 211.02 186.13 154.33 174.75 211.02 186.13 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ3= {{p1,p3},{p2},{p4}} 158.05 211.01 169.44 154.33 166.05 211.01 175.84 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ4= {{p1,p4},{p3},{p3}} 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ5= {{p2,p3},{p1},{p4}} 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ6= {{p2,p4},{p1},{p3}} 174.74 202.38 186.13 145.70 174.74 211.98 186.13 148.90 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ7= {{p3,p4},{p1},{p2}} 174.74 211.01 165.49 133.69 174.74 211.01 178.29 140.09 240.00 240.00 236.87 236.87 240.00 240.00 251.27 236.87
Φ8= {{p1,p2},{p3,p4}} 174.75 211.02 165.49 133.69 174.75 211.02 178.29 140.09 240.00 240.00 236.87 236.87 240.00 240.00 251.27 236.87
Φ9= {{p1,p3},{p2,p4}} 158.05 202.38 169.44 145.70 166.05 211.98 175.84 148.90 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ10= {{p1,p4},{p2,p3}} 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 174.74 211.01 186.13 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ11= {{p1,p2,p3},{p4}} 137.19 190.15 148.57 154.33 148.39 198.15 158.17 154.33 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ12= {{p1,p2,p4},{p3}} 167.69 195.33 186.13 138.65 174.09 204.93 186.13 148.24 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00 240.00
Φ13= {{p1,p3,p4},{p2}} 152.77 211.01 143.52 128.41 163.97 211.01 159.52 141.21 229.97 240.00 226.84 226.84 244.37 240.00 239.64 233.24
Φ14= {{p2,p3,p4},{p1}} 174.74 184.64 147.75 107.31 174.74 199.04 162.15 116.91 240.00 234.65 231.52 231.52 240.00 249.05 242.71 237.92
Φ∗15 = {{p1,p2,p3,p4}} 138.61 170.48 118.67 108.74 153.01 184.88 136.27 124.74 227.20 231.88 218.71 218.71 241.60 246.28 236.31 234.71
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Fig. 6: Analysis of the stable coalition formation
including (i) varying the penalty C(p)i and the outsourcing
cost C(c)i , (ii) varying the transferring cost C
(t)
p , (iii) varying
the breakdown probability Pd, and (iv) varying the initial cost
C
(i)
d . Figures 7(a), (e), (g), and (j) show the costs of the
coalition, when all the shippers cooperate, i.e., the coalition
structure Φ15. Similarly, Figures 7(b), (e), (h), and (k) show
the numbers of customers which are served by the drones,
served by the outsourcing carrier, and whose packages are
transferred to another depot under the coalition structure Φ15.
Figures 7(c), (f), (i), and (l) show the impact of the parameters
to the stable coalitions.
When the penalty and the outsourcing cost are set such
that C(p) = C(c)i and are varied, the shippers outsource all
packages to the carrier when the outsourcing cost is cheap,
i.e. C(c)i ≤ S$14. As a result, the shippers do not cooperate.
If all the shippers are cooperate (Φ15), three drones are used
to serve 44 customers for C(c)i = S$16, and four drones are
used to serve 51 customers for S$16 ≤ C(c)i ≤ S$20. The
remaining customers are served by the carrier. Note that the
drone cannot serve 9 customers because they are outside the
serving area as indicated in Figure 5a.
All the shippers will cooperate when C(c)i ≥ S$18 for
the deterministic approach and C(c)i = S$20 in the Bayesian
approach. However, the experiment of varying transferring cost
(C(t)p ) has a different result. Specifically, all the shippers coop-
erate (Φ15) when the transferring cost is cheap (C
(t)
p = S$0),
and they do not cooperate when the transferring cost is high.
If all of the shippers cooperate, i.e., Φ15, three drones are
used to serve 44 customers, and 34 packages are transferred
when C(t)p ≤ S$30. Moreover, when all the shippers cooperate
(Φ15), the experiments of varying the breakdown probability
and varying the initial cost share a similar trend. In partic-
ular, four drones are used when the breakdown probability
is small (Pd ≤ 0.025) and when the initial cost is cheap
(C(i)d ≤ S$90). After the parameters increase to a certain
point, i.e., Pd = 0.0375 and C(i)d = S$105, the number
of allocated drones decreases to three. After increasing the
parameters further until the drone delivery cost is higher than
the outsourcing cost, no drone is used when Pd ≥ 0.0625
and C(i)d ≥ S$120 for the experiment of varying breakdown
probability and varying the initial cost, respectively.
Based on Figure 7c, we can conclude that the stable
coalition structure is affected by the system parameters. From
the experiments, the deterministic approach tends to let the
shippers join a coalition easier and leave the coalition harder
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than the Bayesian approach. Again, the deterministic approach
considers the case that all shippers always deliver all packages
successfully. For example, when the outsourcing cost is high,
the deterministic approach lets the shippers form coalition
structure Φ15 since C
(c)
i = S$18 while the Bayesian approach
lets them deliver individually and form the same coalition
later at C(c)i = S$20. In contrast, the Bayesian approach
lets shippers p1 and p2 leave the coalition Φ15 immediately
after the transferring cost increases to C(t)p = S$10 while the
deterministic approach lets all the shippers cooperate Φ15 until
C
(t)
p = S$20. Note that we have explained the impact of the
initial cost in Section VIII-B, especially the reason that the
stable coalition structure is Φ14 when the initial cost is small,
i.e., C(i) = S$0.
D. Simulation
We also conduct the simulation experiments to validate the
numerical results in which breakdown events are simulated.
• In the first experiment, we focus on the package assign-
ment with two cases. In the first case, the package assign-
ment does not consider the breakdown when obtaining
the solution, and in the second case, it considers the
breakdown. The first and second cases are referred to as
the deterministic drone delivery (DDD) and the stochastic
drone delivery (SDD), shown in Figure 8, respectively.
• In the second experiment, we focus on the package as-
signment, cost sharing, and cooperation management. We
compare our BCoSDD framework and other approaches
in Figure 9. In DDD and SDD approaches, none of the
shippers cooperate. In CoDDD and CoSDD approaches,
the shippers can cooperate without considering misbehav-
ior. Nonetheless, in all the approaches, the cooperative
shippers can misbehave.
We experiment the SDD approach with only one shipper,
i.e., p3. From Figure 8, the total cost achieved from the SDD
approach is lower than or equal to that of the DDD approach.
When the breakdown probability and penalty cost increase, the
SDD approach tends to assign packages to the carrier more
easily than the DDD approach because the DDD approach
does not consider the breakdown. As such, the SDD approach
can avoid the penalty cost better than the DDD approach.
Therefore, the SDD approach achieves the lower total cost than
that of the DDD approach when the breakdown probability
is 0.15 ≤ Pd ≤ 0.2 and when the breakdown penalty is
S$26 ≤ C(p) ≤ S$30.
Furthermore, Figure 9 presents the individual cost that each
shipper needs to pay when using different approaches. The
BCoSDD approach achieves the stable coalition structure Φ6,
which shippers p2 and p4 cooperate. However, the CoDDD and
CoSDD approaches achieve the stable coalition structures Φ13
and Φ15. Based on the simulation results, the solution from
the CoDDD approach favors shipper p2, but the solution is not
fair to the other shippers as they will pay a higher delivery cost
than that when they does not cooperate. Similarly, the solution
from the CoSDD approach favors shipper p3. Apparently, the
distributed cost for each shipper from the BCoSDD approach
is always relational and the lowest cost compared with the
DDD, CoDDD, SDD, and CoSDD approaches.
E. Belief Update Mechanism
The belief update mechanism is used in the BCoSDD
framework in multiple iterations. We evaluate the belief update
mechanism of the BCoSDD framework by assuming that
shippers p1 and p2 always deliver all packages when they
cooperate, i.e., good cooperative shippers, while shippers p3
and p4 will misbehave with a probability of 0.25, i.e., they are
the bad cooperative shippers for 25% of the time. Therefore,
the shipper whose packages are unsuccessfully delivered by
shippers p3 and p4 needs to pay the penalty. All the shippers
are initialized to believe that the other shippers will deliver all
packages, i.e., P (bpq = TG) = 1 and P (bpq = TB) = 0.
Figure 10 shows the belief probabilities and the stable
coalition structure over iterations, i.e., until the belief prob-
abilities converge. From Figure 10b, at the first iteration,
shippers p1 and p3 cooperate with each other, and shippers
p2 and p4 cooperate with each other, i.e., Φ9. Since shipper
p1 transfers 11 packages to shipper p3 and shipper p3 only
delivers 8 of them, the belief probability of shipper p1 to
shipper p3 decreases, i.e., P (b1,3 = TG) = 0.92, at the
second iteration. Note that shipper p3 does not transfer any
package to shipper p1 at the first iteration. Similarly, the
belief probability of shipper p2 to shipper p4 also decreases,
i.e., P (b2,4 = TG) = 0.92 at the second iteration. Thus, at
the second iteration, the stable coalition structure changes to
Φ6. Shipper p1 does not want to cooperate with shipper p3
anymore, but shipper p2 still cooperates with shipper p4. The
stable coalition structure is also updated according to the belief
probabilities. The belief probabilities are continuously updated
based on the observation of the unsuccessful delivery. After
the sixth iteration, the belief probabilities converge, and all the
shippers have learned about the other shippers’ behavior. In
this case, all the shippers do not want to cooperate with each
other, i.e, coalition structure Φ1 is reached.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We have proposed the Bayesian Shipper Cooperation in
Stochastic Drone Delivery (BCoSDD) framework. The un-
certainties of drone breakdown and shipper misbehavior have
been considered in this framework. The goals of this frame-
work are to help multiple shippers (i) plan their package
delivery by either using drones to serve customers or out-
sourcing the delivery to a carrier and (ii) decide whether
the shippers should cooperate or not to minimize the de-
livery cost. To address the problem, we have proposed (i)
package assignment, (ii) cost management, and (iii) shipper
cooperation management in the BCoSDD framework. We have
formulated the package assignment as the multistage stochastic
programming. In the shipper cooperation management, we
have used the merge and split algorithm to reach a stable
coalition structure. The Bayesian game approach has been
utilized to address the uncertainty of shippers’ misbehavior.
For a shipper that does not have prior knowledge about the
other cooperative shippers, we have proposed the belief update
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Fig. 8: Simulation results of deterministic (DDD) and stochas-
tic (SDD) approaches of shipper P3 with one drone.
Fig. 9: The comparison of simulation results.
mechanism. The belief probabilities will be updated according
to the observation when each delivery is performed. At the
end, the extensive experiments of the BCoSDD framework
have been conducted by using two datasets, i.e., Solomon
Benchmark suite and a real dataset from a Singapore logistics
industry. Based on the experiments, we can conclude that the
BCoSDD framework can achieve the most effective solution,
e.g., the lowest cost, compared with other baseline approaches.
X. ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was partially supported by Singapore Institute of
Manufacturing Technology-Nanyang Technological University
(SIMTech-NTU) Joint Laboratory and Collaborative research
Programme on Complex Systems.
REFERENCES
[1] Transparency Market Research , “E-commerce Logistics Market (Service
Type - Warehousing (Mega Centers, Hubs/Delivery Centers, Returns
Processing, Centers), Transportation (Air/Express Delivery, Freight/Rail,
Trucking/Over Road, Maritime)) - Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share,
Growth, Trends and Forecast 2016 - 2024,” July 2016.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Loop Iteration
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1
Be
lie
f P
ro
ba
bi
lity
P13
P23
P24
P34
P43
(a) Belief probabilities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Loop Iteration
14,23
13,24
12,34
34,1,2
24,1,3
23,1,4
14,2,3
13,2,4
12,3,4
1,2,3,4
Co
al
itio
n 
St
ru
ct
ur
e
P1&P2=Good, P3&P4=Bad
(b) Stable coalition formation
Fig. 10: Belief update mechanism, where shippers p1 and p2
always deliver packages, shippers p3 and p4 deliver only 75%
of packages that belong to the other cooperative shippers.
[2] H. Lee, M. Boile, S. Theofanis, and S. Choo, “Game theoretical models
of the cooperative carrier behavior,” KSCE Journal of Civil Engineering,
vol. 18, no. 5, pp 1528-1538, June 2014.
[3] S. Sawadsitang, D. Niyato, P. S. Tan and P. Wang, “Supplier Cooperation
in Drone Delivery,” in Proc. IEEE 88th Veh. Technol. Conf. (VTC Fall),
Chicago, IL, USA, August 2018.
[4] C. Lin, K. L. Choy, G. T. S. Ho, S. H. Chung and H. Y. Lam, “Survey of
Green Vehicle Routing Problem: Past and future trends,” Expert Systems
with Applications, vol. 41, pp. 1118-1138, 2014.
[5] M. M. Solomon, “ Time Window Constrained Routing and Scheduling
Problem,” Transportation Science, vol. 22, pp. 1-13, 1988.
[6] G. Berbeglia, J.-F. Cordeau, I. Gribkovskaia and G. Laporte, “Static
Pickup and Delivery Problems: A Classification Scheme and Survey,”
TOP, vol. 15, pp. 1-31, Jul 2007.
[7] V. Pillac , M. Gendreau, C. Guret and A. L. Medaglia. “A review of
dynamic vehicle routing problems,” European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 225, pp. 1-11, Feb 2013.
[8] M. Gendreau, G. Laporte and R. Seguin, “ Stochastic vehicle routing,”
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 88, pp. 3-12, 1996.
[9] G. Laporte, “The Vehicle Routing Problem: An overview of exact and
approximate algorithms,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol.
59, pp. 345-358, 1992.
[10] G. Laporte, M. Gendreau, J. Y. potvin, and F. Semet, “Classical
and modern heuristics for the vehicle routing problem,” International
transactions in Operational Research, vol. 7, pp. 285-300, 2000.
[11] K. Sundar and S. Rathinam, “Algorithms for Routing an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle in the Presence of Refueling Depots,” in IEEE Transactions
on Automation Science and Engineering, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 287-294,
2014.
[12] C. C. Murray and A. G. Chu, “The flying sidekick traveling salesman
problem: Optimization of drone-assisted parcel delivery,” Transportation
Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 54, pp. 86109, 2015.
[13] S. M. Ferrandez, T. Harbison, T Weber, R. Sturges, R. Rich, “Optimiza-
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 15
tion of a truck-drone in tandem delivery network using k-means and ge-
netic algorithm,” in Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management,
Vol. 9, pp. 374-388, 2016.
[14] K. Dorling, J. Heinrichs, G. G. Messier and S. Magierowski, “Vehicle
Routing Problems for Drone Delivery,” in IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 70-85, 2017.
[15] I. Hong, M. Kuby, A. T. Murray, “A range-restricted recharging station
coverage model for drone delivery service planning,” Transportation
Research Part C: Emerging Technologies, vol. 90, pp. 198-212, 2018.
[16] S. Sawadsitang, D. Niyato, P.S. Tan, P. Wang, “Joint Ground and Aerial
Package Delivery Services: A Stochastic Optimization Approach,” IEEE
Transaction on Intelligent Transportation, pp. 1-14, 2018.
[17] M. A. Krajewska, H. Kopfer, G. Laporte, S. Ropke and G. Zaccour,
“Horizontal cooperation among freight carriers: request allocation and
profit sharing,” Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 59, pp.
1483-1491, 2008.
[18] P. Liu, Y. Wu and N. Xu, “Allocating collaborative profit in less-than-
truckload carrier alliance,” Journal of Service Science and Management,
vol. 3, pp. 143-149, 2010.
[19] M. Frisk, M. Gothe-Lundgren, K. Jornsten and M. Ronnqvist, “Cost
allocation in collaborative forest transportation,” European Journal of
Operational Research, vol. 205, pp. 448-458, 2010.
[20] A. Kimms and I.Kozeletskyi, “Core-based cost allocation in the coop-
erative traveling salesman problem,” European Journal of Operational
Research, vol. 248, pp. 910-916, 2016.
[21] M. Guajardo and M. Ronnqvist, “A review on cost allocation methods
in collaborative transportation,” Intelligent Transportation in Operation
Research, vol. 23, pp. 371392, 2016.
[22] R. Kaewpuang, D. Niyato, P. S. Tan, and P. Wang, “Cooperative Manage-
ment in Full-Truckload and Less-Than-Truckload Vehicle System,” IEEE
Transaction on Vehicular Technology, vol. 66, pp. 5707-5722, 2017.
[23] R. B. Myerson, “Game Theory, Analysis of Conflict,” Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1991.
[24] W. Saad, Z. Han, R. Zheng, A. Hjorungnes, T. Basar and H. V. Poor,
“Coalitional Games in Partition Form for Joint Spectrum Sensing and
Access in Cognitive Radio Networks,” in IEEE Journal of Selected Topics
in Signal Processing, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 195-209, April 2012.
[25] C. J. L. Arachchige, S. Venkatesan, and N. Mittal, “An asynchronous
neighbor discovery algorithm for cognitive radio networks,” in Proc.
IEEE Symp. on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks
(DySPAN), Chicago, IL, USA, Oct. 2008.
[26] J.S. Milton and J. Arnold, “Introduction to Probability and Statistics:
Principles and Applications for Engineering and the Computing Sci-
ences”. McGraw Hill, 1995.
[27] K. Akkarajitsakul, E. Hossain and D. Niyato, “Coalition-Based Coopera-
tive Packet Delivery under Uncertainty: A Dynamic Bayesian Coalitional
Game,” IEEE Transaction on Mobile Computing, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 371-
385, 2013.
[28] M. Pourahmadi, “Foundations of Time Series Analysis and Prediction
Theory”. John Wiley & Sons, 2001.
[29] Singpost. [Online]. Available: http://www.singpost.com/
[30] M. M. Solomon,“Algorithms for the vehicle routing and scheduling
problems with time window constraints,” in Operations Research, vol.
35, pp. 254-265, 1987.
[31] D. Chattopadhyay, “Application of General Algebraic Modeling System
to Power System Optimization,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 15-22, Feb 1999.
Suttinee Sawadsitang received her B.Eng in Com-
puter Engineering from King Mongkuts University
of Technology Thonburi (KMUTT), Thailand in
2012 and M.Eng from Shanghai Jiao Tong Univer-
sity, China in 2015. She is currently pursuing a Ph.D.
degree at SIMTech-NTU Joint Lab on Complex Sys-
tems, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Her research interests are in the area of transporta-
tion systems, operations research, optimization, and
high performance computing.
Dusit Niyato (M’09-SM’15-F’17) is currently a
professor in the School of Computer Science and
Engineering, at Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He received B.Eng. from King Mongkuts
Institute of Technology Ladkrabang (KMITL), Thai-
land in 1999 and Ph.D. in Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering from the University of Manitoba,
Canada in 2008. His research interests are in the area
of energy harvesting for wireless communication,
Internet of Things (IoT) and sensor networks.
Puay Siew Tan received the Ph.D. degree in com-
puter science from the School of Computer Engi-
neering, Nanyang Technological University, Singa-
pore. She is presently an Adjunct Associate Pro-
fessor with the School of Computer Science and
Engineering, Nanyang Technological University and
also the Co-Director of the SIMTECH-NTU Joint
Laboratory on Complex Systems. In her full-time job
at Singapore Institute of Manufacturing Technology
(SIMTech), she leads the Manufacturing Control
TowerTM (MCTTM) as the Programme Manager. She
is also the Deputy Division Director of the Manufacturing System Division.
Her research interests are in the cross-field disciplines of Computer Science
and Operations Research for virtual enterprise collaboration, in particular
sustainable complex manufacturing and supply chain operations in the era
of Industry 4.0.
Ping Wang (M08, SM15) received the PhD degree
in electrical engineering from University of Water-
loo, Canada, in 2008. She was with Nanyang Tech-
nological University, Singapore. Currently she is an
associate professor at the department of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science, York Univer-
sity, Canada. Her current research interests include
resource allocation in multimedia wireless networks,
cloud computing, and smart grid. She was a core-
cipient of the Best Paper Award from IEEE Wire-
less Communications and Networking Conference
(WCNC) 2012 and IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC)
2007. She served as an Editor of IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communica-
tions, EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, and
International Journal of Ultra Wideband Communications and Systems.
Sarana Nutanong received the Ph.D. degree in
computer science from the University of Melbourne,
Australia, in 2010. He is currently an Assistant
Professor with the Department of Computer Science,
City University of Hong Kong (CityU), Kowloon,
Hong Kong. Before joining CityU, he was a Post-
doctoral Research Associate at the University of
Maryland Institute for Advanced Computer Stud-
ies between 2010 and 2012 and held a research
faculty position with the Johns Hopkins University
from 2012 to 2013. His research interests include
scientific data management, data-intensive computing, spatialtemporal query
processing, and large-scale machine learning.
